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Abstract: This paper presents an assessment of how successful an eavesdropping attack on a contactless payment transaction can be in terms
of bit and frame error rates, using an easily concealable antenna and low-cost electronics. Potential success of an eavesdropping attack largely
depends on the correct recovery of the data frames used in the ISO 14443 standard. A near-ﬁeld communication inductive loop antenna was
used to emulate an ISO 14443 transmission. For eavesdropping, an identical inductive loop antenna as well as a shopping trolley modiﬁed to
act like an antenna were used. The authors present and analyse frame error rates obtained with the authors equipment over a range of distances,
up to 100 cm, well above the ofﬁcial maximum operating distance depending on the magnetic ﬁeld strength.1 Introduction
Contactless transactions ranging from access control and ticketing
[1, 2] to ﬁnancial payments [3, 4] are becoming increasingly
popular in Europe, Asia and the United States. It is estimated that
there are at least 23 million such contactless cards in circulation
in Britain [5] and mobile devices equipped with near-ﬁeld commu-
nication (NFC) account for 13.32% of worldwide web trafﬁc [6].
The idea is that for relatively low values the point of sale (POS)
may not need an online transaction approval, making contactless
an attractive solution for transactions that need to happen quickly,
such as ticketing and low-value payments. Reasons for this rise in
popularity include the promotion of contactless cards by banks
and the decision of popular mobile phone manufacturers to equip
their handsets with NFC technology [7]. Big players in electronic
payments such as VISA [8], Mastercard [9] and Google [10] have
already developed platforms for contactless payments.
There is, however, a growing concern about the security risks.
Vulnerability to skimming attacks, where an attacker extracts infor-
mation from the victim’s contactless device without him realising
have been identiﬁed in [11]. Additionally, the ISO 14443 standard
states that a contactless card should respond to any device generat-
ing a magnetic ﬁeld capable of powering it up. Based on this, an
attacker could build a rogue transmitter that could power up and in-
terrogate the target extracting information such as the unique iden-
tiﬁers (UID) [12] that could be used as means of tracking the owner
of the target device. Skimming attacks are not the only potential
threat to contactless systems. There is also the threat of relay
attacks, which involves activating the victim’s card from a distance
and transmitting the probed information to a legitimate reader to
complete a transaction [13]. Google’s Wallet application, despite
being in its infancy, has already been put under scrutiny in [14]
in the context of relay attacks. Finally, eavesdropping, where the at-
tacker attempts to listen in on an ongoing transaction between a con-
tactless device and reader, has already been demonstrated as a
possible attack on contactless cards. In [15, 16], eavesdropping
on contactless communications from distances well over 20 cm
was shown, invalidating the claim that the operating range of
high frequency (HF) radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) is
within the near ﬁeld only.
However, published results show a wide variety of eavesdrop-
ping distances. This, to some extent, can be attributed to the differ-
ent experimental set up each researcher used. In [16], an
off-the-shelf receiver and eavesdropping antenna were used on a
Philips Mifare token and the attacker observed uplink communica-
tion (token to reader) on an oscilloscope from up to 4 m. What isJ Eng 2013
doi: 10.1049/joe.2013.0087
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can be recovered from the signal observed on the oscilloscope. In
[17], raw signals were observed from up to 6.5 m using a single
1 m loop as an eavesdropping antenna, but there is no mention of
any speciﬁc details on the receiver set-up. A reader generating a
measured magnetic ﬁeld of 3.1 A/m and an ISO 10373–6 compliant
smartcard were used. Eavesdropping was carried out with single-
loop antennas with diameters of 30 and 50 cm. Respectively,
binary data were recovered from up to 3.5 m. In [18], a similar
signal processing approach was used along with commercially
available receiver and receiving antenna to recover binary data
from 1 to 3 m depending on the environment in which the attack
was carried out. In [19], theoretical work was shown that aims to
give a measure of eavesdropping success given a certain distance
in the form of achievable bit error rates (BER). A variety of noise
environments were modelled, but no practical results were given.
Bit recovery in [19, 20] was achieved using synchronous demodu-
lation (i.e. a coherent receiver) in software. In [17], on the other
hand, no bit recovery was attempted. In [19], it was shown that
there is a 15% difference in performance between a coherent de-
modulator and a non-coherent one.
All previously listed attacks achieved a range of eavesdropping
distances from 1 to 6.5 m. This variation can be attributed to the dif-
ferent equipment and operating conditions. What is missing, al-
though, is practical results showing how reliably eavesdropping
can be carried out, quantifying how much of a transmitted sequence
can be recovered at the eavesdropping end at various distances.
Measurements from [16–20] relied on often expensive or bulky
equipment that cannot be easily replicated in a portable system.
In our paper, we determined how reliably information from an
ISO 14443 Type A device could be recovered by an eavesdropper,
in a way that could be used to obtain sensitive information from the
victim using a covert antenna and low-cost electronics. Emphasis
was on frame error rate (FER) as in order to recover meaningful in-
formation that could lead to compromising a victim’s ﬁnancial se-
curity or privacy, data need to be recovered in the form and structure
that was originally transmitted.
2 System description
2.1 Transmitter
An NFC device can operate in three modes. In peer-to-peer mode as
speciﬁed in ISO 18092 [21] where such devices can exchange data
ﬁles (e.g. images) or set up a wireless link between them.
Additionally, an NFC device can also operate in reader/writeraccess article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
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Fig. 2 Transition between two PICC frames
Fig. 1 Sequence of 5 bits, Manchester encoded and then loaded onto the
847 kHz subcarriermode, also known as proximity coupling device (PCD). The PCD is
acting as the reader that generates the electromagnetic ﬁeld required
to power passive transponders fs = 13.56 MHz which in turn
responds by load modulating the carrier signal with a fs = fc/16 =
847 kHz subcarrier. In PCD mode, an NFC device is able to read
passive poster tags [22] or contactless smartcards. Finally, the last
mode of operation is that of contactless smartcard emulation. In
this mode, the NFC device assumes the role of a smartcard typically
used for contactless payments or ticketing applications.
Implementation of this mode is dictated and governed by the ISO
14443 standard, where two types of smartcards (referred to as prox-
imity integrated circuit card or PICC) are speciﬁed, Type A and
Type B. For the purpose of our work, we chose to concentrate on
smartcard emulation mode because this is the de facto mode for
contactless payments used today on the high street. We also
chose to focus on Type A emulation as this is the most common
type used in contactless payments. From this point forward, when
we refer to the standard, we mean the ISO 14443 standard.
In order to be able to measure the FER of an eavesdropping
attack, the transmitted data need to be known at the receiving
end. To accomplish this, standard compliant frames were generated
in software. We chose to transmit only PICC frames because we
wanted to focus on studying the uplink communication because
this is more likely to contain information useful to an attacker.
The standard states that for data exchange between devices,
frames referred to as ‘standard frames’ are to be used. These
frames are longer than the ‘short frames’ used to initiate and estab-
lish communication. As our emphasis is on obtaining sensitive in-
formation from the PICC, only ‘standard frames’ were
transmitted. Each ‘standard’ frame consists of 9n bits (8 data +
parity bit for each of n bytes) along with the start of frame (SOF)
and end of frame (EOF) bits. SOF is a Manchester encoded
binary ‘1’ and the EOF is speciﬁed as an unmodulated carrier
with a duration equal to 9.44 μs. After examining the trace ﬁle of
a ﬁnancial contactless transaction, we found that the majority of
standard frames were between 40 and 80 bytes long. For this
reason, we chose to use a ‘standard’ frame size of 60 bytes. A
random binary sequence was generated and Manchester encoded
as per standard guidelines shown in Table 1. The 847 kHz sub-
carrier was generated in software using an external trigger signal
at 1.7 MHz. This frequency was chosen to ensure we would have
at least two samples for each subcarrier cycle. This sampling fre-
quency resulted in each modulated bit consisting of 16 samples
and having a duration of 9.41 μs. The standard speciﬁes the bit dur-
ation as 128/fc and abbreviates it to 9.4 μs. The process of encoding
the baseband signal and then on-off keying (OOK) modulating it on
the subcarrier is illustrated in Fig. 1.
At the end of each frame, an extra 160 guard samples, equivalent
to 94.1 μs, were inserted. This was done to meet the requirement of
at least 86.4 μs between the last transmitted PICC frame and the
next PCD response, with the carrier ﬁeld being on for the whole
duration. The transition delay between two PICC frames transmitted
consecutively is illustrated in Fig. 2.Fig. 3 Transmitter and receiver arrangement
Table 1 ISO 14443 type A modulation
PICC–PCD PCD–PICC
modulation OOK modulated 847 kHz
subcarrier, load modulated
carrier
100% ASK
baseband Manchester code modiﬁed
code
Miller
synchronisation SOF, EOF bits SOF, EOF
bits
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Fig. 4 Loop antenna used for transmission and receptionFor the transmission and reception of our frames, the arrange-
ment shown in Fig. 3 was used. The subcarrier modulated output
of the data acquisition (DAQ) card was passed to an IQ modulator
for modulation with the carrier signal at 13.56 MHz. An attenuator
in-between was used to control the baseband voltage at the input of
the modulator. A signal generator was used to generate the 13.56
MHz sinusoidal carrier and the resulting modulation was 100%
ASK (OOK). In order to obtain enough current at the transmit
antenna to transmit the standard speciﬁed magnetic ﬁeld (1.5–7.5
A/m), an RF ampliﬁer was used along with a step attenuator to
control the magnetic ﬁeld strength. Our work in [23] showed that
eavesdropping distances vary signiﬁcantly based on the H-ﬁeld
strength. Unlike the work shown in [17, 18], with our arrangement
the strength of the H-ﬁeld was fully adjustable and not dependent
on a given commercial PCD device. This is an important alteration
since the generated H-ﬁeld strength is at the discretion of the PCD’s
manufacturer, as long as it is within the broad range speciﬁed by the
standard. For transmission, a single-loop cylindrical antenna similar
to the one that could be found in an NFC device was used, shown in
Fig. 4. However, unlike conventional NFC antennas, the inductive
loop was matched to 50 Ω to be compatible with the power ampli-
ﬁer. The match was achieved using a low-value series resistor and
parallel capacitor, which ensured minimal loss [24]. The antenna’s
resonant frequency was at 13.56 MHz with a bandwidth of 2 MHz
to include the modulation sidebands.Fig. 5 Variance smoothing and threshold2.2 Hardware receiver
Two antennas were used for reception that are easily concealable,
unlike in previous work that relied on either commercial products
[18] or large diameter antenna [17] that would make covert eaves-
dropping impractical. For further details on the design of the eaves-
dropping antennas refer to [23, 24]. The eavesdropped signal was
fed to an LNA (to maximise signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)) and
then another RF ampliﬁer followed by a bandpass and notch
ﬁlters to suppress side band noise and the unwanted 13.56 MHz
carrier, which can be up to 90 dB higher than the PICC’s response
[25]. The second RF ampliﬁer was used to compensate for the
losses because of the two ﬁlters. This ensures that the peak detector
used for Type A demodulation will be able to distinguish the modu-
lating sidebands without interference from the carrier.
Although, in theory, a coherent receiver offers superior perform-
ance, its implementation is not straightforward. If done in hardware,
in order to maintain phase synchronisation, a PLL circuit is needed
which would increase the complexity of the design signiﬁcantly.J Eng 2013
doi: 10.1049/joe.2013.0087
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caused by the difference in phase between the local clock and the
received carrier [26]. If, on the other hand, a software implementa-
tion is used as in [20], the necessary high-speed sampling would in-
crease data and processing requirements considerably. For example,
Hancke in [18] used a (coherent) hardware receiver which mixed
the eavesdropped signal up to 30 MHz which was captured at
100 MS/s for just 320 ms. This is not a compact or portable solution
and high-speed sampling equipment is very expensive. One could
replace our DAQ card with an ﬁeld programmable gate array
(FPGA)-based solution at reasonable cost and end up with an eaves-
dropping kit small enough to ﬁt in a backpack or briefcase. In order
to obtain accurate error rates, we transmitted a long series of frames.
At 100 MS/s with 16-bit sampling, this would require approximate-
ly 112 GiB. By implementing a non-coherent receiver in the form
of a logarithmic ampliﬁer [27] acting as a peak detector, we were
able to overcome the above limitations.2.3 Software decoder
The output of the peak detector was captured on the analogue input
of the DAQ card at 1.7 MHz. Decoding of the eavesdropped data
were done ofﬂine. The idea was that the attacker would capture a
number of transactions and then decode them later.
As the eavesdropping distance gets longer or background inter-
ference gets stronger, the SNR will reach a point where the captured
samples can no longer be decoded without further software process-
ing. The top half of Fig. 5 shows the effect noise has on the trans-
mitted data. The vertical line indicates the SOF, with anything
before that being just an unmodulated 13.56 MHz carrier signal,
emulating the PCD’s magnetic ﬁeld. In order to minimise the
impact of noise, we chose to use the variance of the captured
samples as a way of achieving frame synchronisation. The nature
of Manchester encoding ensures that the variance of the carrier
signal loaded with an encoded subcarrier will always be higher
than that of the carrier corrupted by AWGN.
A sliding window of length 32 samples (2 bits) was used to
compute the variance of the captured samples. The reason this par-
ticular size was chosen is illustrated as follows: a binary sequence is
ﬁrst Manchester encoded and then modulated with the 847 kHz
subcarrier. Owing to the nature of Manchester encoding, a sequence
of ‘1 0’ or ‘0 1’ will always cause a dip in variance after Manchester
encoding because of the prolonged lack of state transitions since ‘1
0’→ ‘1 0 0 1’ and ‘0 1’→ ‘0 1 1 0’. With a sliding window of 16
samples during the occurrence of these two sequences, the variance
drops to a minimum between samples 0–16 and 64–80 falsely indi-
cating a SOF/EOF. With a window of 32 samples, this problem is
avoided. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/
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Fig. 6 Variance window size
Fig. 7 Experimental set upThis approach provides us with preliminary frame synchronisa-
tion by detecting the sample positions where a drop in variance
above or below a certain threshold value occurs. We deﬁne this
threshold, ρ, as a fraction corresponding to a value between the
most frequent high and low variance values. Crossing ρ signals
the start and end of a frame.
Fig. 5 illustrates another problem that we faced. When the SNR
becomes low enough, the variance of the captured samples can still
falsely dip below ρ = 60%. This value of ρ was chosen because
after some preliminary testing, we found it to be performing consist-
ently well for a variety of SNR. In this example, data start at sample
60 and continues until the end of the plot. In order to solve this
problem of false dipping, we applied Gaussian smoothing to the
variance curve. The degree of smoothing was determined by, σ,
the standard deviation for the Gaussian kernel. The lower half of
Fig. 5 illustrates the effect of different σ values. With no smoothing
(σ = 0), the variance curve crosses ρ between samples 80–96 and
130–150 causing the software to interpet this as three different
frames when only one was transmitted. With σ = 10, the variance
curve stays above ρ. Owing to the length of the sliding window
being equal to 32 samples (2 bits) the variance curves cross the
threshold 16 samples (1 bit) earlier than where they should had
done, but since this is a constant difference it is easily addressed
by adding an offset of 16 samples to the variance detected frame
start positions. In the case of σ = 30, this applies excessive smooth-
ing causing the variance curve to never fall below the value of ρ and
consequently the SOF.
Robust frame synchronisation is achieved with a combination of
cross-correlation and frame length check. Frames start with a set
SOF sequence and end with an EOF sequence as deﬁned in the
standard. The SOF being a Manchester encoded binary ‘1’ would
cause the variance to rise and cross ρ. This position plus 16
samples (the offset mentioned earlier because of the chosen
window size) give us the SOF position. The EOF, being an un-
modulated carrier, is a bit trickier to accurately detect. For this
reason, a frame length check is used. According to the standard,
the shortest possible frame is a ‘short frame’ consisting of seven
data bits and the SOF/EOF markers. Given our sampling rate of
1.7 MHz, such a frame would have a length of 144 samples.
However, a ‘short frame’ is only used for a few commands. The
standard speciﬁes that ‘standard frames’ are used for the rest of
communication. Such frames consist of 9n bits (8 data + parity bit
for each of n bytes) along with the SOF and EOF markers (each
being 1 bit long) with each bit encoded as 16 samples. Based on
this, the shortest possible standard frame (n = 1) will consist of
(9 × 16) + 32 samples. Since we are able to accurately detect the
SOF, the correct EOF is found by adjusting the rough frame
end position until the resulting frame length minus the length of
SOF/EOF markers is a multiple of 144. Manchester encoded bitsThis is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
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computed.3 Experimental set-up
The aim of our work was to determine the reliability with which an
eavesdropper could recover information from a contactless payment
based on the ISO 14443 standard. To do so, some known frames
had to be transmitted according to the speciﬁcations detailed in
the previous section and eavesdropped at the receiving end. In
order for our results to be reliable, a number of frames had to be
transmitted that was large enough to allow sufﬁcient errors to
occur. As we also wanted to simulate different power levels for
an eavesdropping distance of 20–170 cm hence requiring a lot of
experiments to be carried out, we chose to transmit 5000 frames.
This number was large enough to cause errors and at 20 minutes
per run allowed us to ﬁnish a set of experiments in a single day.
In order for the results to be entirely based on the capabilities and
performance of our receiver design, we wanted to experiment in a
controlled environment. By running our experiments inside an an-
echoic chamber, we ensured that no external interference was
affecting our results. Most of the equipment was kept outside the
chamber and an RF cable was used to feed the signal to the trans-
mitter antenna inside the chamber. This approach allowed us to
avoid any risk of cross-coupling between measurement equipment.
Tests were conducted to verify such coupling was not present.
Fig. 7 illustrates the whole arrangement. Inside the chamber, the
transmitting antenna was kept at a ﬁxed position. The receiving
antenna connected to the receiver circuit (Fig. 8) was moved at
various distances, in increments of 5 cm. Power levels resulting
in H-ﬁeld strength of 1.45, 3.45 and 7.45 A/m were used. These
values allowed us to emulate the minimum, maximum and in-
between values of what is speciﬁed in the standard.
For reception, two different antenna designs were used. The
single-loop cylindrical antenna shown in Fig. 4 and a shopping
trolley [22]. The trolley was positioned 2–30 cm away from the
transmitting antenna. Once all captures were completed, they
were processed ofﬂine. A ﬁrst set of experiments was performed
with 500 transmitted frames. This was carried out to determine a
suitable pair of σ and ρ within reasonable time. Eavesdropped
data at each distance and H-ﬁeld strength was processed with aCommons
s.org/
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Fig. 9 7.45 A/ m 85 cm σ and ρ selection
Fig. 8 Receiver circuit and eavesdropping antenna
Fig. 10 Summary of FER results with σ= 10 and ρ= 57range of Gaussian smoothing factors, with σ in the range of 0–40,
and ρ in the range of 49–65. Error rates obtained were then plotted
as shown in Fig. 9. This was done to determine whether a single
pair of σ, ρ values could be used at all distances and H-ﬁeld
strengths. Empty spaces on the pseudo-colour plots indicate
instances were no frames were detected at all or frames were
received at a length that was not a multiple of the ‘standard
frame’ size as described earlier.
We found that σ = 10, ρ = 57 gave consistently good results. We
took the worst-case scenario, for example, the furthest distance at a
particular H-ﬁeld strength that we could eavesdrop and looked for a
pair there that worked at all distances regardless of the H-ﬁeld
strength. This pair was not always the ideal choice, for example,
at 85 cm σ = 10 and ρ = 61 gave a lower FER. However, this set
of values performed consistently well across all distances.
Establishing this pair of values is important because the attacker
will not have knowledge of the eavesdropped H-ﬁeld strength or
distance, let alone the current SNR.Fig. 11 Shopping trolley eavesdropping arrangement4 Results
All results presented in the following section are for transmissions
of 5000 frames. Experiments were performed on two separate days
to ensure that our results were reproducible. Experiments conﬁrmedJ Eng 2013
doi: 10.1049/joe.2013.0087
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resulting H-ﬁeld strength. Distances achieved were between 20 and
90 cm in the case of the maximum H-ﬁeld strength (7.45 A/m).
From our own work with commercial PCD devices,
mobile phones and ISO 14443 Type A smartcards by various man-
ufacturers, we found that the generated H-ﬁeld varies
drastically from product to product. It is not unrealistic for a
victim’s device that is <1 cm away from a PCD to generate a
high H-ﬁeld up to the maximum 7.5 A/m to ensure reliability for
a transaction.
FERs that were achieved with various H-ﬁeld strengths and
eavesdropping distances are illustrated in Fig. 10. To ensure the
consistency and reliability of our results, experiments were repeated
on a second day. In the case of 3.45 A/m, an experiment on a third
day was also performed. Using normal approximation, interval
levels with 95% conﬁdence were also plotted for each result.
Even with the minimum H-ﬁeld, reliable eavesdropping was pos-
sible up to 40 cm. This is still a distance an attacker could easily
ﬁnd himself from his victim without raising any suspicion. For
example, this could be the case in a crowded underground station
or at the checkout queue of a supermarket. Another interesting
ﬁnding is the rate at which the FER degrades after a certain point.
It can be seen that FER increases very sharply in the space of 5–
10 cm regardless of the H-ﬁeld strength.access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
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Fig. 12 Shopping trolley FER with (σ= 10 and ρ= 50)Based on the results shown in Fig. 10 achieved FERs vary to a
small extent. FER for 1.45 A/m remained consistent and reprodu-
cible through all of the experiments. A 7.45 A/m on the other
hand was less consistent as can be seen from the ﬁrst run at that
ﬁeld strength. We attribute this to the fact that as the eavesdropping
distance gets longer, correct alignment of the two antennas becomes
more difﬁcult to accomplish and at the same time it has a much
greater impact on the results. The reason for this behaviour is the
very low SNR at these distances, so even the slightest deviation
has a big impact. For 3.45 A/m, with the exception of the ﬁrst ex-
periment the rest returned nearly identical results. We also experi-
mented with the shopping trolley (Fig. 11) to see whether a large
metallic structure such as a trolley or metallic shelving found in
an environment where eavesdropping is likely to happen could
have any effect. The key difference compared with our inductive
loop is that the trolley is a lossy antenna [24], and generates its
own noise. This lowers the SNR and because of it the σ, ρ pair
used before is no longer applicable to this antenna. By repeating
the same process as described in the previous section, we found
that the trolley gave the lowest FER with σ = 10 and ρ = 50, and
these results are illustrated in Fig. 12. The difference in FER
between H-ﬁeld strengths is similar to what we achieved with the
inductive loop, in terms of the relative eavesdropping distances, al-
though they are all shorter. A key difference was the FER at
minimum ﬁeld strength, was in steps of 2 cm, no errors occurred
from 4 to 6 cm and then at 8 cm the FER shot to 100%. This is
because the transmitted H-ﬁeld strength was already very low at
1.5 A/m and given that H-ﬁeld strength is inversely proportional
to the cube of the distance, a very small change in eavesdropping
distance will have the drastic effects, as observed here. Owing to
the lack of intermediate points, a logarithmic scale was not used
in this case.5 Conclusions
We have shown that eavesdropping on HF RFID contactless com-
munication is largely dependant on the strength of the magnetic
ﬁeld generated by the victim device. Depending on the H-ﬁeld
strength, eavesdropping distance can be within the 20–90 cm
range in a shielded environment. Such an environment is not unreal-
istic as similar conditions could be found in an underground station.
All of our work has been carried out using inexpensive and
off-the-shelf electronics along with a DAQ card. This card costs
£1500, but in a system designed to be deployed, it can be replaced
with a considerably less expensive FPGA-based system or a laptop-
based DAQ. An attacker could assemble our receiver at low cost
and easily conceal it in a backpack. In addition to this, byThis is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommon
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
6making use of Gaussian ﬁltering and variance computation in soft-
ware an attacker can achieve frame synchronisation in a robust way.
We have shown that a good pair of ﬁxed parameters works consist-
ently regardless of the eavesdropping distance or the H-ﬁeld
strength and only depends on the characteristics of the eavesdrop-
ping antenna.
Future work involves experimenting with actual mobile phones
and contactless cards instead of synthetic data and examining the
information that could be eavesdropped and its potential towards
a privacy attack on the victim.
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